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47 PERB 1J3015 STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
WATERTOWN PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 191, IAFF-NYSFFA,
Charging Party,
-and-
CITY OF WATERTOWN,
Respondent.
CASE NO. U-30590
BLITMAN & KING, LLP (NATHANIEL G. LAMBRIGHT of counsel), 
for Charging Party
SLYE & BURROWS, ESQS. ( ROBERT J. SLYE of counsel), for 
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Watertown (City) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in an improper practice proceeding.1 
The ALJ held that the City violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, on November 4, 2010, it unilaterally terminated a 22 year 
practice of permitting battalion chiefs represented by the Watertown Professional 
Firefighters Association, Local 191, IAFF-NYSFFA (Association) to select their 
vacations on or before the 15th_day of each month for a vacation to be taken during the 
following month. In place of the practice, the City directed battalion chiefs to select their
1 46 PERB H 4580 (2013).
vacations all at once and it limited the number of their vacations to three per year.
In reaching her conclusion, the ALJ rejected the City’s arguments that the 
practice was not mandatorily negotiable because it did not affect the entire bargaining 
unit and that it had the right to unilaterally terminate the practice and revert to the terms 
of Article 6, §§ 1(b) and 1(h), of the parties’ 2009-2011 collective bargaining agreement.
EXCEPTIONS
The City’s exceptions reiterate its arguments to the ALJ. The Association filed 
a response in support of the ALJ’s determination. For the reasons that follow, we affirm 
the ALJ, in part on different grounds, and we adopt her remedial order.
FACTS
The material facts are not in dispute and are accurately recounted by the ALJ.2 
The City’s fire department consists of firefighters, fire captains, battalion chiefs, a deputy 
chief and a fire chief. Firefighters, fire captains and battalion chiefs are members of the 
bargaining unit represented by the Association. The department’s work schedule is 
divided into four platoons, each headed by a battalion chief. A fifth battalion chief is in 
charge of training and is not permanently assigned to a platoon. Pursuant to Article 5 of
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, members of each platoon work a “10 and
\
14” schedule, meaning that they work three consecutive days from 8:00 a.mvto 6:00 
p.m., followed by three days off, followed by three nights from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.
Unit employees accrue a certain number of vacation days each year, depending on 
years of service with the department.
Article 6 of each of four collective bargaining agreements from 1990 to 2011 sets
2 For the sake of brevity, we do not recite the ALJ’s record references.
forth the procedure by which unit employees are allowed to choose when they take their
vacations. Each contains identical language in subsection (b):
The City will schedule annual leave so as to allow a 
maximum number of six (6) line personnel, excluding 
Battalion Chief to be off during any one period. The 
selection of Fire Captains and Fire Fighters to be off 
shall be governed solely by seniority. [Emphasis 
added.]
Employees who choose not to take their vacations in a single period are
permitted to split their allotted vacation time into shorter periods. Prior to the parties’
2000 -  2003 collective bargaining agreement, the process by which split vacations
were selected was pursuant to Article 6 (i):
Members of the Watertown Fire Department shall be 
allowed to split their vacations. When a member elects 
to split his vacation, he shall be given his first choice 
according to his standing on an updated seniority list.
Fie shall not make a second selection until all other 
members of the Fire Department have made their first 
* selection. [Emphasis added.]
Under this “round robin” selection process, there was no limit to the number of split 
vacations that could be taken.
Although Article 6 (i) was applicable to “[m]embers of the Watertown Fire 
Department,” because battalion chiefs were excluded from the seniority-based system 
of selecting vacations under Article 6 (b), they were also excluded from the seniority 
based “round robin” selection process set forth in Article 6 (i). Instead, battalion chiefs 
selected their vacations pursuant to a non-contractual practice.
Unlike firefighters and captains, who select their vacations once each year, 
battalion chiefs submitted their vacation selections to the scheduling chief (a nonunit 
deputy chief) on or before the 15th day of the month prior to the month in which the
vacation was to be taken. There is no dispute that the practice permitted battalion 
chiefs to take one vacation each month and two during one month, provided, also, that 
they had to take one nine-day vacation each year. Upon the battalion chiefs’ notice of 
their intent to take a vacation during the following month, the scheduling chief placed 
their selection on the monthly vacation schedule.
During negotiations for the parties’ 1999 -  2003 contract, the City proposed to
eliminate the exclusion of battalion chiefs from the seniority based vacation selection
process specified in Article 6 (b). The Association rejected the proposal and it went no
further. However, in a Memorandum of Understanding that concluded their
negotiations, the parties agreed to “limit the number of [vacation] picks for all employees
to three per year.” Accordingly, the parties’ 1999-2003 contract replaced Article 6 (i),
quoted above, with a new subsection (h) that stated:
Members of the Watertown Fire Department shall be 
allowed to split their vacations and shall be limited to (3) 
picks. When a member elects to split his vacation, he 
shall be given his first choice according to his standing 
on an updated seniority list. He shall not make a 
second or third selection until all other members of the 
Fire Department have made their first or, if relevant, 
second selection. [Emphasis added ]
Nevertheless, as before, battalion chiefs were excluded from the “round robin” selection 
process in Article 6 (h) pursuant to the parties’ construction of Article 6 (b), which 
remained unchanged. Battalion chiefs continued to select their vacations on or before 
the 15th day of each month for a vacation to be taken during the following month.
The dual system of selecting split vacations continued unabated until November 
4, 2010, when, in response to a complaint by a firefighter, the City announced that the 
2011 vacation picks for battalion chiefs would be made pursuant to Article 6 (b) and (h),
quoted above. The announcement stated, in relevant part: “As the Battalion Chiefs are 
excluded from selecting vacations by seniority, they are limited to three picks. . . [which] 
need to be submitted to the Deputy Fire Chief prior to December 10, 2010 for inclusion 
on the master vacation schedule. . . .” Thus, the announcement reduced the number of 
vacation periods that the battalion chiefs could take, and it eliminated their right to select 
their vacations during each month prior to taking them.
DISCUSSION
First, we reject the City’s argument that a negotiable practice must apply to all 
members of the relevant bargaining unit in order to be cognizable under the Act. Only 
once did the Board squarely advance that notion, and its decision was annulled by the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, because the Board did not explain the basis for its 
departure from the opposite well established rule.3 Just as an employer must negotiate 
with a union concerning benefits that are designed to address unique circumstances of 
one or more individual unit members, so too must an employer satisfy its bargaining 
obligations before terminating mandatorily negotiable practices that are uniquely 
applicable to unit individuals or groups of individuals.4
Second, we reject the City’s argument that it had the right to terminate the at- 
issue 22 year old practice by “reverting” to the terms of its collective bargaining 
agreement with the Association -  Article 6 (b) and (h). In Springs Union Free School 
District, we recently observed:
3 See, State of New York (Dept of Correctional Servs), 35 PERB If 3030 (2002), 
annulled sub nom. New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Assn, v 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 309 AD2d 1118, 36 PERB If 7017 (3rd Dept 2003).
4 See, e.g., County of Nassau, 37 PERB H 3014 (2004).
When “parties have reached an agreement with respect 
to a specific subject following negotiations, a party may 
unilaterally end a past practice without violating the Act 
by reverting to the terms of a specifically negotiated 
provision of the agreement.” The burden, however, 
rests with the respondent to prove a contract reversion 
defense through negotiated terms that are reasonably 
clear on the specific subject at issue. If an “agreement 
is reasonably clear but susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, extrinsic evidence, such as negotiation 
history and/or a past practice, is admissible to 
determine the intent of the parties.”5
Here, Article 6 (i) -  later 6 (h) -  has not changed since 1990, except that, 
beginning in 2000, the provision limited the number of “round robin” picks to three. 
However, as the parties agree, Article 6 (b) has consistently excluded battalion chiefs 
from the “round robin” system of picking vacations under Article 6 (i) and (h), creating an 
ambiguity as to the applicability of those provisions to battalion chiefs. The parties’ own 
long-standing practice resolves this ambiguity. They have consistently understood that 
the three-vacation limitation under Article 6 (i) -  now (h) -  does not apply to battalion 
chiefs. Thus, the reference to “members of the Watertown Fire Department” in Article 6 
(i) and (h) has never applied to battalion chiefs. That finding is supported by the 
negotiations history of Article 6 (h), which shows that the City unsuccessfully attempted 
to include battalion chiefs in the “round robin” system of picking vacations by eliminating 
the language in Article 6 (b), which excluded them from seniority based picks. Indeed, 
the notice terminating the at-issue practice acknowledges that battalion chiefs are not 
subject to seniority based vacation selections, in effect, the record shows that while the 
seniority based selection process may go around only three times for firefighters and 
captains, the round robin system does not apply to battalion chiefs. Rather, their
5 45 PERB ll 3040 (2012), at 3102 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
system of picking vacations has always been based on the at-issue non-contractual 
practice. Accordingly, we find that the City has not met its burden of proof to establish 
that its decision to terminate the at-issue practice was a permissible reversion to the 
terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ’s rejection of both of the City’s defenses.
We now turn to the negotiability of the practice; i.e., whether the City had a 
bargaining obligation concerning its termination.
In order to establish a mandatorily negotiable past practice, the charging party 
must show that the practice was unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period 
of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among 
the affected unit employees that the practice would continue.6 However, the threshold 
inquiry is always whether the practice concerns a mandatorily negotiable term or 
condition of employment.7
Although the ALJ held that the elements of a practice cognizable under the Act 
were established on the record, she made no finding as to the negotiability of the 
subject -  procedures by which employees select their vacations. Indeed, the parties
6 Town oflslip vPub Empl Relations Bd,__NY3d__ (June 14, 2014), 2014 WL
2515720; 47 PERB U 7001 (2014); Chenango Forks Cent School Dist, 40 PERB P012 
(2007), confirmed sub nom. Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
95 AD3d 1479, 45 PERB U 7006 (3d Dept 2012), affirmed 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB U 
7008 (2013); Manhasset UFSD, 41 PERB 3005 (2008), confirmed and mod in part 
sub nom. Manhasset UFSD v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231,42 PERB U 7004 
(3d Dept 2009), on remand 42 PERB 3016 (2009); Fashion Inst o f Tech, 41 PERB 
3010 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Fashion Inst of Tech v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 68 
AD3d 605, 42 PERB U 7011 (1st Dept 2009).
7 State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 38 PERB U 3018 (2005); 
Town of Carmel, 31 PERB 3006 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Town of Carmel PBA v 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 267 AD2d 858, 32 PERB 7028 (3d Dep't 1999).
offered no arguments regarding that issue. Ordinarily, we would consider remanding 
that issue to the ALJ for further analysis. But, given our discussion below, we deem it 
more expeditious to address the issue ourselves.
In Town of Carmel,8 the Board held that a procedure that provided for the pre­
approval of vacations was not mandatorily negotiable because the pre-approved 
absences necessarily impaired the employer’s staffing prerogatives at the time the
vacations were taken. There, vacations were selected in December of each year, and
\
the procedure allowed two or more employees to be on vacation at any given time, so 
long as there was a predetermined number of employees on duty on any particular shift. 
In the spring of each year a second round of vacation selections was permitted, again, 
so long as the employer’s pre-determined minimum staffing requirements were 
satisfied. All such selections were based on seniority.
The Board held that the employer had no bargaining obligation with the union 
before it terminated the “early pick” procedure. Although the employer’s predetermined 
minimum staffing requirements were unaffected, the Board reasoned that it was the 
employer’s staffing prerogatives that were impaired. For example, an employee who 
selects a vacation in December, to be taken in July, will be off duty at that time, 
necessarily reducing the number of employees who will be available to work. This, 
according to the Board, made the early pick procedure nonmandatory, because it 
impaired the employer’s ability to make adjustments to its minimum staffing 
requirements when the vacations, are taken; i.e., its staffing prerogatives. That the early
8 31 PERB U 3006 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Town of Carmel PBA v Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 267 AD2d 858, 32 PERB 7028 (3d Dep't 1999).
pick procedure did not affect the employer’s actual predetermined staffing requirements 
was immaterial to the impact it had on the employer’s prerogatives.
Similarly, in State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) (hereafter, 
State DOCS),9 relying on Carmel, the Board held that a practice of pre-approving sick 
leave requests in increments of four hours or less to attend elective medical 
appointments was nonmandatory. The Board held: “[a]s was the case in Carmel, pre­
approval necessarily constrains an employer's right to set staffing levels, a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation.”10 12
Arguably, under the Carmel and State DOCS analysis, the practice at issue in 
this matter would not be mandatorily negotiable because it impairs the City’s staffing 
prerogatives when the vacations are taken. However, having carefully reviewed the 
negotiability analysis in those decisions, we now believe them to be inconsistent with 
the statutory duty to negotiate concerning terms and conditions of employment and our
long-standing precedents, including City of Yonkers (hereafter, Yonkers)™ on which
\  -
Carmel was based, and City of White Plains (hereafter, White Plains),12 on which 
Yonkers was based.
In White Plains, the Board held that an employer had the right to determine the 
number of employees it must have on duty to fulfill its mission. However, it further 
observed that the employer was obligated to negotiate over methods of meeting its
9 38 PERB 1J3018 (2005).--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Id., at p. 3064.
11 10 PERB H 3056 (1977).
12 5 PERB H 3008 (1972).
staffing requirements -  there, the start and end times and duration of the employees’ 
tours of duty. The Board held that the former is a nonmandatory management 
prerogative (staffing), while the latter are mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of 
employment (hours of work).
In Yonkers, relying on White Plains, the Board held that an employer had no 
bargaining obligation concerning the distribution of vacation slots over the course of the 
year. In that case, the employer unilaterally terminated a practice of permitting a 
disproportionate number of employees to take their vacations during desirable months. 
The employer, instead, unilaterally redistributed available vacations slots throughout the 
year, thereby reducing the number of employees who could be on vacation at any given 
time, but maintaining a more consistent staffing level throughout the year. While 
recognizing that some employees would not be able to take their vacations during the 
prime vacation months, the Board held:
' * i  .
[The City] may determine the number of unit employees 
that it must have on duty during each of the vacation 
periods. Within that framework, it is obligated to 
negotiate over the order in which vacation preferences 
may be granted.13 14
Because the employer did not alter the procedure by which the available vacations slots 
were selected, the Board dismissed the charge complaining of the unilateral 
redistribution of the number of available slots during the prime months.
Similarly, in Fairview Professional Firefighters Association,14 relying on Yonkers, 
the Board reiterated the proposition that while an employer need not negotiate over the
13 City of Yonkers, 10 PERB H 3056 at p. 3099 (1977).
14 12 PERB H 3118 (1979).
number of employees it requires to be on duty, it has a bargaining obligation concerning 
the method by which employees bid for available vacation times. The Board rejected 
the employer’s argument that the proposed vacation procedure impaired its staffing 
prerogatives.
Under White Plains, Yonkers and Fairview Prof Firefighters, an employer’s right 
to determine the number of employees it requires to deliver its services (minimum 
staffing) is nonmandatory, while the procedures by which employees select when to 
work (shifts and tours) or when not to work (vacations) are mandatory, provided that the 
employers’ pre-determined minimum staffing levels are not impaired.15
The nature of these competing interests is illustrated by City of Newburgh?6
where the Board considered the negotiability of a police union’s bargaining proposal
concerning the use of personal leave. The proposal at issue there provided for 8 days
of personal leave to be taken at the discretion of the unit police officers without regard to
the employer’s staffing requirements. The Board held:
In the typically sensitive area of the performance of 
police functions, [the demand] would eliminate entirely 
management participation in the decision as to 
whether a particular employee could be spared from 
duty at the time sought for personal leave, and it would 
also eliminate all management control over the number 
of employees on personal leave at any one time.17
In effect, under the Newburgh proposal the employer forfeited all control over how many
15 See also, Town of Blooming Grove, 21 PERB 3032 (1988).
16 18 PERB If 3065 (1985) petition for review dismissed, 19 PERB 7005 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany County 1986).
17 Id., at p. 3138.
employees could be off duty on personal leave -  necessarily impairing its established 
staffing requirements.
Together, White Plains, Yonkers, Fairview Prof Firefighters and Newburgh reveal 
our efforts to balance the interests of employers in ensuring an adequate number of 
staff on duty to provide public services against the interests of the employees in 
negotiating their hours of work, including when they may collect the time off that they 
have earned. Under those decisions, both sides must forego unfettered discretion.
In contrast to the earlier decisions regarding paid leave, which served to balance 
the employer’s articulated minimum manning requirements against the employees’ 
negotiable interests in determining when and how they may receive their earned time 
off, Carmel and State DOCS skewed the balance in favor of the employers’ mercurial 
staffing prerogatives. Arguably, under Carmel and State DOCS, an employer could, on 
a moment’s notice, unilaterally declare that now is the time for all employees to take 
their paid leave, because it would be least intrusive on its staffing requirements. 
However, such a directive has been found to be mandatorily negotiable.18 ,
We believe the better approach is to focus on the employers’ right, indeed, its 
responsibility, to determine and maintain staffing levels that can fulfill its mission and still 
accommodate reasonably foreseeable employee absences occasioned by vacations, 
medical appointments, illnesses or other non-contractual or negotiated circumstances. 
Within that framework, an employer may insist upon negotiations with the appropriate 
employee organization concerning the right to recall employees from planned absences,
18 See, State of New York (SUNY at Albany)-, 16 PERB U 3050 (1983), confd sub nom. 
CSEA, Inc. v Newman, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB 7007 (1984) (unilateral directive that 
employees take the day after Thanksgiving as paid leave held mandatorily negotiable).
or condition such paid time off on the absence of unforeseen emergencies.19 Given the 
availability of such negotiable options to further the employer’s managerial staffing 
rights, we conclude that negotiations concerning procedures for pre-approval of paid 
time off are mandatorily negotiable.
Indeed, procedures associated with the implementation of nonmandatory, 
managerial rights are generally mandatorily negotiable. For example, while residency 
requirements pursuant to Public Officers Law § 30.4 (d) are not mandatorily 
negotiable,20 the procedures by which such residency requirements are implemented 
are.21 Similarly, procedures associated with an employer’s implementation of 
nonmandatory rights under General Municipal Law § 207-c are mandatorily 
negotiable.22 An employer’s decision to reduce its workforce through layoffs is 
nonmandatory,23 but the procedures by which such layoffs are implemented are 
mandatory.24 In fact, procedures surrounding an employer’s rights over prohibited 
subjects are mandatorily negotiable 25 The rationale underlying each of these
19 See, e.g., Town of Blooming Grove, supra note 15.
20 See, City of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB 3020 (1985); Salamanca Police Unit, CSEA, 
12 PERB H 3079 (1979).
21 City of Niagara Fails, 43 PERB § 3005 (2010), citing with approval City of 
Schenectady, 25 PERB 4527 (1989).
22 See, City of Watertown v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 N.Y.2d 73, 33 PERB 7007
(2000).----------------------------------------------------------- :------------- ------------------ ---------------- ----------------- ---;-------------
23 City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB U 3060 (1971).
24 Hudson Valley Comm Col, 12 PERB 1J 3030 (1979).
25 Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Tchrs Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 9 PERB jf 7529 (1976).
negotiability decisions is the strong and sweeping policy favoring collective bargaining 
under the Act concerning employees’ terms and conditions of employment; a policy that 
creates a presumption in favor of negotiability.26
Accordingly, we shall no longer follow Carmel and State DOCS to the extent that 
they hold that all procedures by which employees may obtain pre-approved time off are 
not mandatorily negotiable. Rather, we hold that such procedures are mandatorily 
negotiable, provided that they do not interfere with the employer’s predetermined 
staffing requirements. Our decision here is not intended to set aside any other Board 
precedents concerning the negotiability of such procedures.
Because we find that procedures by which employees may obtain pre-approval 
for paid time off are mandatorily negotiable, and having denied the City’s defenses, we 
now turn to the elements necessary to establish an enforceable past practice.
The record fully supports the ALJ’s determination that for over two decades, 
battalion chiefs have been permitted to select their vacations by notifying the scheduling 
chief on the 15th day of the month preceding the vacation. The practice was sufficiently 
unequivocal and continuous to give rise to a reasonable expectation among the affected 
employees that it would continue, subject to negotiations to the contrary. And the City 
was well aware of its existence, as shown by its earlier effort to negotiate for its 
termination as well as the posting of the monthly vacation schedules. Therefore, we 
find that the elements of a negotiable past practice have been shown on this record.
By reason of the foregoing, we find, as did the ALJ, that the City violated § 209- 
a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally terminating the practice by which battalion chiefs
26 City of Watertown v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 N.Y.2d 73, 33 PERB U 7007 (2000).
selected their vacations, and we adopt the ALJ’s recommended remedial order.
THEREFORE, the City of Watertown is directed to forthwith:
1. Rescind its November 4, 2010 directive limiting battalion chiefs to three vacation 
picks per year;
2. Restore the vacation selection system in place for battalion chiefs prior to 
November 4, 2010;
3. Make whole any employee serving as a battalion chief between November 4, 
2010 and the date this order is put into effect who sustained any loss of salary or 
benefits resulting from the implementation of the November 4, 2010 directive, 
together with interest at the maximum legal rate; and
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees.
DATED: August 20, 2014
Albany, New York
NOTICE TO ALL
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Watertown in the unit 
represented by the Watertown Professional Firefighters Association, Local 
191, TAFF-NYSSFFA, that the City will:
1. Rescind its November 4, 2010 directive limiting battalion chiefs to three 
vacation picks per year;
2. Restore the vacation selection system in place for battalion chiefs prior to 
November 4, 2010; and
3. Make whole any employee serving as a battalion chief between 
November 4, 2010 and the date of this order who sustained any loss of 
salary or benefits resulting from the implementation of the November 4, 
2010 directive, together with interest at the maximum legal rate.
Dated By
on behalf of the City of Watertown
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
